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The ways to prevent poverty are well known to us all. Allow every
baby a chance to be born wanted, raised in good health, educated to full
capacity, accepted upon individual merit, welcomed to a range of job
choices according to capacity and interest, paid a good wage, insured at
adequate levels against the economic hazards of the industrial economy,
and assured a comfortable house in a supportive neighborhood, and
opportunities for cultural enrichment, participation in the decisions
affecting his own life, and survival into a respected and secure old age.
In this age, these are not utopian goals. -- Senator Fred Harris, 1970
Once upon a time there was a Little Red Hen who scratched about
and uncovered some grains of wheat. She called her barnyard
neighbors and said, "If we work together and plant this wheat, we will
have some fine bread to eat. Who will help me plant the wheat? .... Not
I," said the Cow. "Not I," said the Duck. "Guaranteed annual bread,"
said the Goose. "Then I will," said the Little Red Hen--and she did...
She baked five loaves of fine bread and held them up for her neighbors
to see. "I want some," said the Cow. "I want some," said the Duck. "I
want some," said the Pig. "I demand my share," said the Goose. When
the Farmer came to investigate the commotion he said, "You must not
be greedy, Little Red Hen. Look at the oppressed Cow. Look at the
underprivileged Pig. Look at the less fortunate Goose. You are guilty of
making second class citizens of them... In other barnyards you would
have to give all five loaves to the Farmer. Here you give four loaves to
your suffering neighbors." And they lived happily ever after, including
the Little Red Hen, who smiled and smiled and clucked "I am grateful, I
am grateful." But her neighbors wondered why she never baked any
more bread. -- Merle Lofgren, 1970, Corson County (So. Dakota) News
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From the sober perspective of the 1980s, when grandiose spending
schemes are few and budget deficits many, the pervasive confidence of
the 1960s in the government’s ability to cure social ills seems distant. But
when the nation was enjoying an unprecedented level of affluence in
the 1960s, no social goal was unattainable, at least in the minds of the
social welfare specialists who made the pilgrimage to Washington dur-
ing the Kennedy years. Professional expertise could be wedded to the
bountiful American economy to erase the anomaly of the richest society
in the world--the persistence of poverty. Nevertheless, the main
manifestation of efforts to diminish poverty, the Family Assistance Plan,
failed to win passage in Congress, and the New Jersey Graduated Work
Incentive Experiment, designed to test the labor supply response, was
part of that losing effort. The Family Assistance Plan was ultimately re-
jected, however, not because something was wrong with the research
experiments that claimed to support it but because it failed to achieve
the integration of political perspectives that would have made these
claims acceptable. 1
Setting the Stage: Policies in Search of Constituencies
"There was no ’demand’ (in the interest group sense) for a war on
poverty," writes Lawrence Friedman.2 Rather, the "demand" came
from the supply side, from the scholars who studied poverty and the
bureaucrats who would conduct the battles. Self-interest was merged
with social interest, in what Moynihan calls the "professionalization of
reform.’’a The time appeared ripe for the rapid enactment of the Great
Society poverty agenda. Even in a heady era of government expansion,
however, the idea of a guaranteed income4 was too extreme for a liberal
President to embrace: "It will hurt its chances of ever being passed if it’s
connected with me," President Johnson warned,s
Proposals for a negative income tax appeared in the academic
literature6 and within the U. S. Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare bureaucracy, gaining support from policy elites but generating
little enthusiasm among politicians or the public. According to Robert
Levine, the negative income tax "was not regarded as a serious proposal
that could be enacted in less than a decade.’’7 But interest in direct
payments to the poor increased as disappointment with the training and
service programs of the Great Society grew. For many liberals, the direct
income transfer was just another strategy for bringing the fruits of
affluence to the poor. Job training, housing, money--each program was
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ment. "A psychology of scarcity produces anxiety, envy, egotism, (but)
a psychology of abundance," which the guaranteed income would help
achieve, according to Erich Fromm, "produces initiative, faith in life,
solidarity.’’s For others, particularly economists, it was the market in-
dividualism of the income strategy that made it attractive.
The strongest and most consistent support for the negative income
tax has come from economists. In May 1968, 1200 economists signed a
petition in support of a negative income tax.9 "It gives help in the form
most useful to the individual, namely, cash," wrote Milton Friedman,
and "It makes explicit the costs borne by society.’’1° Liberal and conser-
vative economists could agree that the negative income tax, which
would provide universal, nationally uniform cash payments, would in-
crease efficiency by reducing administrative costs and allowing indi-
viduals to pursue their own preferences. "The curse of the poor is
literally their poverty. Give them more money," urged Paul Samuelson,
"and not only they but their progeny can break through the vicious
circle.’’11 Guaranteed income was seen as a technically superior
mechanism; a simple, efficient, visible transfer would replace a myriad
of complex programs with their hidden costs. The devotion of
economists to cost minimization through less bureaucratic procedures
appears to have overridden the political implications of making it so
easy to distribute welfare payments.
The negative income tax is an ideological hybrid, ill-fitted to com-
mon conceptions of liberalism or conservatism. Should conservatives
oppose guaranteed income plans because they reward those who are
irresponsible and indolent, or favor them because they allow poor
individuals to pursue their own preferences free from government direc-
tion? Should liberals support income guarantees because they ease the
misery of the unfortunate, or oppose them because they, perpetuate
inequality? The struggle over the guaranteed income can be described as
a clash between three political cultures: hierarchy, libertarianism, and
egalitarianism. These cultures are composed of people who share values
justifying the social relations they deem desirable.
Hierarchs believe they have a social obligation to provide for the
poor and that the poor cannot be trusted to look after their own in-
terests. They will support paternalistic social policies, such as providing
food, clothing and moral guidance to the needy. Egalitarians find pater-
nalism offensive because it implies that some are wiser and should have
more power than others. They will support poverty policies that seek to
redistribute income and resources. Libertarian individualists believe it is
the responsibility of each person to escape poverty and that the govern-
ment should not tell anyone how to do it.170 Dennis ]. Coyle and Aaron Wildavsky
The Nixon Plan and the Welfare Establishment
Richard Nixon came to office seeking to show that a Republican
could put together a domestic reform package that would meet the
nation’s social goals without overburdening the economy. He created an
Urban Affairs Council, bringing in specialists in welfare policy who in-
cluded several Democrats with experience in previous administrations,
most prominently Daniel Patrick Moynihan. For policy proposals and
data, the most available sources were bureaucrats within the Office of
Economic Opportunity and the Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare. The hibernation of the negative income tax plans during the
Johnson years was coming to an end. "The welfare reform plan that had
been brusquely dismissed by President Johnson was hauled out and
dusted off," according to Martin Anderson. "The plan was rewritten,
numbers were updated, and a few new ideas were added.’’12
Persuaded by Moynihan, Nixon reached into the welfare policy net-
work and pulled out the Family Assistance Plan, which he presented to
the public in a televised address on August 8, 1969. The Plan would
have provided a minimum guaranteed annual income (subject to work
requirements of debatable enforceability) of $1600 to every family in
America; it also reduced benefits by 50 percent of earned income until
the break-even point of $4000. Over the next 40 months, the Plan rose
and died and rose again, as a series of bills won support in the House
but wasted away in the Senate.
The Family Assistance Plan essentially was an attempt to provide
enough enticement to each of the three political cultures to win their
support, or at least to weaken their opposition. The Plan would extend
benefits to millions of new recipients and establish a guaranteed income,
which was supposed to please egalitarians. Limiting the plan to families
would weaken egalitarian support but would be necessary to gain
hierarchical backing by making it possible to argue that the Plan would
strengthen a traditional institution--the family. Hierarchs would object
to letting the poor control their own expenditures through direct
payments, but this was necessary to entice individualists, who could
support a program that would reduce government interference with the
autonomy of poor people.
One might expect the Plan to have been supported by welfare
workers and recipients. But this was not so. The criticisms from the
welfare profession and welfare rights groups were that the guaranteed
income was too low, was not universal, and was tied to work re-
quirements. Social Work, the journal of the National Association of Social
Workers, was filled with condemnations of welfare, and particularly the
Family Assistance Plan, as a tool for the repression of poor people: "The
welfare system . . . has . . . been used by society as an instrument toSOCIAL EXPERIMENTATION 171
deny dignity to the soul. [Its features] contribute to totalitarian domina-
tion of the poor by those in power.’’13
Critics focused on the requirements that welfare recipents be
available for suitable work or job training, or risk a reduction in their
families’ benefits, saying that the Plan would mean "compulsory work
or starvation for mothers of school-age children.’’14 Exceptions were to
be made for mothers of young children, and child care and job training
were to be provided. But the attempts to prepare recipients to be self-
supporting were condemned as hoaxes: giving training to blacks on
welfare would raise their aspirations, yet racial discrimination would
prevent them from finding jobs. Ultimately, according to William
Taylor, approval of Nixon’s plan would be "social dynamite," causing a
new wave of riots in the cities: the Plan "will... produce a new group
of individuals who feel relatively deprived, frustrated, and angry
enough to be susceptible to civil disorder and strife.’’is
Social welfare thinkers called for recognition of a national right to at
least poverty-level subsistence for all individuals; they resented any sug-
gestion that those who chose not to work were somehow inferior or
should have their benefits reduced. "A person who does not work,"
complained Miriam Dinerman, "is virtually a nonperson.’’16 "An indi-
vidual should be able to claim maintenance as a legal right," George
Hoshino argued, "unconditioned by the judgments of another person
about his behavior.’’17 The Nixon income plan, while aiding millions of
new recipients, was seen as perpetuating too many of the evils of the
welfare system to deserve support from the welfare establishment.
The years of the major congressional battles over guaranteed income
plans, 1969-72, coincided with the zenith of the National Welfare Rights
Organization (NWRO). The group was founded in 1966 under the direc-
tion of George Wiley, a former university chemist who resigned his
faculty position to work directly for what he considered the rights of
poor people. He was influenced by Richard C|oward and Frances Fox
Piven, who then (they have since changed their views somewhat) con-
ceived of welfare as a form of state oppression: the poor got a pittance in
return for legitimizing the very institutional arrangements that kept
them poor. Advocating a militant strategy of poor people demanding all
the payments they were entitled to under aid to families with dependent
children (AFDC), they argued this would overload the system and cause
its collapse and replacement by a universal guaranteed income. A
grassroots network was set up aimed at recruiting recipients of AFDC,
the largest welfare program. In order to strengthen the organization, the
National Welfare Rights Organization provided assistance not to the
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Only members were provided with forms and assistance to obtain the
special grants from the welfare department. As long as this information
and assistance remained an exclusive payoff for members only--a
"private good"--the NWRO membership and number of affiliate WRO
groups multiplied. When these monetary incentives disappeared, or
became widely available, the membership dropped almost as fast as it
had risen.18
The special provisions embodied in welfare law were essential to the
National Welfare Rights Organization because these made it worthwhile
for clients to make special demands. Income maintenance would abolish
or narrow special provisionsl
The Family Assistance Plan would directly benefit the poor in states,
mostly in the South, that provided payments below the minimum
national level (originally $1600, later raised to $2400), but most National
Welfare Rights Organization members lived in northern states that
already had higher benefit levels. It would extend benefits to the work-
ing poor, who were also not represented in Organization membership.
The Family Assistance Plan was in the best interests of the majority of
the poor, according to Moynihan, but, "like the early trade unionists,
the NWRO represented the aristocracy of welfare recipients.’’19
The Public View: A Different Definition of Poverty
In a Gallup poll conducted shortly after Nixon’s August 1969
speech, 65 percent of respondents said they had a favorable opinion of
the Family Assistance Plan, while only 20 percent said their opinion was
unfavorable (table 1). The White House received over 2700 responses to
the speech, characterizing 81 percent as favorable and only 9 percent as
opposed. Media reaction was also positive; a Health, Education, and
Welfare Department survey of newspaper editorials concluded 95 per-
cent were favorable, and called newspapers in the 25 largest metropoli-
tan areas "enthusiastic" about the plan.
A very different understanding of public attitudes, one that would
predict opposition to any guaranteed income plan, emerges when
respondents are asked to evaluate specific approaches to reducing
poverty. Opposition to a guaranteed income, even for families, was
strong and consistent (table 1). A Gallup poll in September 1965 found
67 percent opposed, 19 percent in favor. In May 1968, 58 percent were
opposed, 36 percent in favor. The guaranteed income was opposed by
every income group except those with incomes under $3000, who
favored it by 3 percentage points, an insignificant margin. A December
1968 Gallup poll reported 32 percent favoring a guaranteed income and
62 percent opposed. Every income group was opposed.SOCIAL EXPERIMENTATION 173
Table 1
Public Opinion on Guaranteed Income Plans
In general, would you say you have a favorable or unfavorable opinion of




It has been proposed that instead of relief and welfare payments, the govern-
ment should guarantee every family a minimum annual income. Do you favor or




As you may know, there is talk about giving every family an income of at
least $3200 a year, which would be the amount for a family of four. If the family
earns less than this, the government would make up the difference. Would you
favor or oppose such a plan? (Gallup: May 1968)
Total: Income over $10,000:
Favor 36% Favor 26%
Oppose 58 Oppose 68









Identical question (Gallup: December 1968)
Income over $10,000: Income under $3000:
32% Favor 24% Favor 43%
62 Oppose 72 Oppose 44
6 No opinion 4 No opinion 13
Opinions about welfare proposals shifted dramatically when the
subject was guaranteeing or requiring jobs (which seem to have a similar
meaning in the public’s mind), not income (table 2). In 1964, 84 percent
of the public agreed that men on relief who are physically able should be
required to take any job offered that paid the going wage; support was
identical among the lowest income group. According to a May 1968
Gallup poll, 78 percent of the public favored guaranteeing jobs to a wage
earner in each family; support was very consistent, ranging from 75 per-
cent among middle income recipients to 86 percent among blacks. A
December 1968 poll yielded virtually identical results. In each case, a
guaranteed income plan providing $3200 to a family of four was strongly
opposed, yet a guaranteed jobs program providing the same income
received wide support.174 Dennis J. Coyle and Aaron Wildavsky
Table 2
Public Opinion on Work for the Poor
Here are some plans that have been suggested about the handling of relief.
Will you tell me what you think about each one for this area? All men on relief
who are physically able to work must take any job offered which pays the going
wage. Would you favor or oppose this plan for this area? (Gallup: November
1964)
Total: Lowest Income Group
Favor 84% Favor 85%
Oppose 11 Oppose 7
No opinion 5 No opinion 8
If men on relief, who are physically able to work, cannot find jobs, then they
must work for the city on streets, parks, and the like. Would you favor or oppose
this plan for this area? (Gallup: November 1964)
Total: Lowest Income Group
Favor 82% Favor 79%
Oppose 12 Oppose 11
No opinion 6 No opinion 10
Another proposal (other than the guaranteed income) is to guarantee enough
work so that each family that has an employable wage earner would be
guaranteed enough work each week to give him a wage of about $60 a week or









Income over $10,000: Income under $3000:
78% Favor 77% Favor 83%
18 Oppose 20 Oppose 16
4 No opinion 3 No opinion 1
Identical question (Gallup: December 1968)
Income over $10,000: Income under $3000:
79% Favor 76% Favor 77%
16 Oppose 22 Oppose 11
5 No opinion 2 No opinion 12
The provision of goods and services in lieu of money was also sup~
ported by the public (table 3). In November 1964, 73 percent of
respondents to a Gallup poll favored reducing the money given to per~
sons on relief and giving them food and clothing instead; support was
high even among the lowest income group. A 1969 poll found 68 percent
of the public in favor of giving food stamps to families with earnings
below $20 per week; agreement was strong within all income groups
and regions.SOCIAL EXPERIMENTATION 175
Table 3
Public Opinion on Food and Clothing for the Poor
Some communities provide food and clothing to persons on relief, reducing
the amount of money given to them. How do you feel about this? Do you think
that it is a good idea or a poor idea? (Gallup: November 1964)
Total: Lowest Income Group:
Good idea 73% Good idea 65%
Poor idea 19 Poor idea 25
No opinion 8 No opinion 10
A United States senator has proposed that the Government give free food
stamps to all families whose earnings are under twenty dollars a week. Do you
favor or oppose such a proposal? (Gallup: April 1969)
Total: Income over $10,000: Income under $3000:
Favor 68% Favor 67% Favor 76%
Oppose 25 Oppose 27 Oppose 17
No opinion 7 No opinion 6 No opinion 7
Would you favor or oppose giving food stamps at a greatly reduced rate to




The public shared with policy elites a concern for the poor and a
belief that the government should do something to alieviate poverty.
Important aspects of the negative income tax received public support:
that a minimum for poor families should be guaranteed by government,
and that the working poor should receive benefits. But the mass public
opposed a guaranteed income, preferring instead to guarantee, and re-
quire, work. "Not many Americans outside the antipoverty
community," writes Hugh Heclo, "’seemed to accept the concept of a
right to income as such but only to the necessities income might buy.’’2°
Representative Landrum voiced this sentiment when he complained,
"The priorities of this bill [the Family Assistance Plan] are wrong. They
are: cash, first; food, second; and work, third. I believe there should be a
reversal in priorities: work, first; food, second; and cash, last.’’21 This
partly explains why there was to be a food stamp program but not an in-
come maintenance program.
Members of the public prefer a different solution--jobs, not
money--because they have a different definition of the problem. If176 Dennis ]. Coyle and Aaron Wildavsky
poverty is the lack of money, then the provision of money should end
poverty. But if poverty is the lack of a job, and the discipline and self-
respect that go with it, then transferring money may only gloss over the
poverty problem. Martin Anderson puts it bluntly when he writes:
The provision of an adequate income may eliminate poverty in
the official sense, but it does not guarantee that those who receive
welfare will spend that income in a manner that also eliminates the
characteristics that many people associate with poverty . . . If they
personally value nice cars, good liquor, and gambling, they may not
have much money left for housing, clothing and food.22
Poverty, for the public, is not only a lack of resources but also a problem
of behavior.
The public’s attitude toward poverty is that giving money to those
who cannot handle it is futile. Better to follow a paternalistic policy of
giving the poor what is good for them--such as food and clothing--and
requiring and guaranteeing work, which will give them the moral
character to be self-reliant. Then (and only then) should they receive the
reward--the freedom to spend their earnings as they please. Rewards
should flow from taking advantage of opportunities, not from getting
rewards in order to seek opportunities.
The public, then, had an ambivalent attitude toward the reforms
embodied in the Family Assistance Plan. They supported the
President’s determination to "clean up the welfare mess," but dis-
trusted transfer payment programs for the poor. The Family Assistance
Plan that failed was no more antithetical to the general public than was
tax reform at a time when majorities thought dealing with the deficit was
more important. In each case it was political elites, not the,public, who
took the lead; it is to their activities that we now turn.
The Battle in Congress: Clash of the Fables
Guaranteed income plans, such as the Family Assistance Plan, were
caught between two opposing cultural myths: One, that the ways to end
poverty, in the words of Senator Harris, "are well known to us all," and
thus any plan that does not provide for the immediate lifting of every in-
dividual out of poverty is inadequate. In this egalitarian view, the costs
of an aggressive program to the social values or economic resources of
the society are inconsequential, or cannot ethically be considered. The
opposing myth, as captured in the tale of the Little Red Hen, is that any
assistance to the poor that is not strongly tied to individual work effort
will destroy the moral fabric and bankrupt the society.
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guaranteed income prior to Nixon’s proposals, they found widespread,
automatic support among "’safe-seat" liberals. "They knew only that
guaranteed income was a liberal issue and that they were liberals; ergo,
their support was automatic... There was little concern with the moral
or even the knotty technical issues involved in guaranteed income.’’23
Liberal support was sufficiently strong in the House to aid passage of
Nixon’s guaranteed income plan, but in the Senate the coalition came
unraveled.
The guaranteed income plans died in part because liberals, en-
couraged by the Administration’s portrayal, began believing their
exaggerated rhetoric about the inadequacy of the Nixon proposal. In
each house, liberals proposed more egalitarian alternatives to the Family
Assistance Plan that would broaden coverage to include all individuals
and greatly raise the minimum floor. "Minimal financial security should
be a right of citizenship," asserted Senator George McGovern, who pro-
moted a Human Security Plan that would guarantee jobs and income to
all. Representative William Ryan introduced the Income Maintenance
Act, a more generous plan based on an Office of Economic Opportunity
draft, and also cosponsored the National Living Income Program, an
outline of which had been drafted by the economist James Tobin. But
the Nixon strategy of downplaying the egalitarian nature of the welfare
reform proposals carried over into some of the congressional alter-
natives. The sponsors of the National Living Income Program
discovered that "the President’s plan appears to be limited to families
with children.’’24 There was "no justification for such discrimination,"
according to Representative Goodell:25 Their own plan, which em-
phasized that payments would go only to families (a buzzword pleasing
to hierarchists), decreed in the fine print that a family shall consist of "at
least one claimant." If only aid to families was politically feasible, then
family would have to be redefined so that none would be excluded.
Family stood for something more than a legal definition of people
living together or related to one another. Family symbolized social
order. Its children stood for the deserving poor, the dependent people
who could not be expected to work until society helped them to help
themselves. The sacrificial ethic of the hierarchical collective, in which
the better off help the worst off, just as officers go first in battle, made
welfare into a matter of mutual obligation, the one to give in good grace,
the other to receive in gratitude, saying metaphorically that it is a good
system that takes care of its own. Eliminate family and you wipe out
Moynihan’s carefully crafted effort to blunt the usual attacks on welfare
(the good us versus the feckless them) through an integrative solution.
For if Americans were all part of the same family, they were just helping
themselves.
Statements by Moynihan, Patricelli and others that the welfare178 Dennis J. Coyle and Aaron WildavsJ
reform plans were major steps toward a universal guaranteed incom,
may have failed to impress egalitarians, but they did not go unnotice~
by individualists. The Family Assistance Plan was condemned b’
Representative John Rarick, who quoted a column in the Economi
Council Letter calling the guaranteed income a "scheme for legal plunde
on a scale without precedent in all history. ,,26 For those who claimed th,
guaranteed income would extend the legacy of the New Deal, The
Street Journal quoted the wisdom of Franklin Roosevelt, who proclaime~
in his 1935 State of the Union address that "To dole out relief is t~
administer a narcotic, a subtle destroyer of the human spirit.’’27
The two camps also made different empirical assertions. Neithe
side seemed terribly concerned about marshaling evidence to support it
arguments. Liberals took it as a matter of faith that the guaranteed in
come would not do significant harm to the economy; to question tha~
would be to criticize the character of the poor. Conservatives believec
that only work, not money, could end poverty. " ’If you cut your owr
wood,’ the philosophy of the conservative legislators went, ’it warm~,
you twice.’ ,,28
The integrative solution embodied in the Family Assistanc~
Plan--family support for conservatives,29 extension of benefits for liber-
tarians, and reduced bureaucracy and greater autonomy fo~
liberals--failed because adherents of these ideologies were not persuad-
ed there was enough in the Plan for them.
The Income Maintenance Experiments:
Policy Analysis as Political Ammunition
Social scientists often cringe when they see how their research is
distorted, if it is noticed at all, in the political arena. Once empirical
studies are disseminated, political expediency may overwhelm the
search for truth, or so the common wisdom goes. "Policymakers, while
not totally subjective and nonrational, will use whatever data are at
hand to support their case," writes Ernest Stromsdorfer. "Canons of
evidence are not ignored but are selectively applied.’’3° In assessing the
use of analyses of Great Society programs, Henry Aaron concludes that
"Evaluation was a political instrument to be trotted out when it
supported one’s objectives or undercut one’s opponents, and to be sup-
pressed, if possible, when it opposed one’s objectives or strengthened
one’s opponents.’’31
What started as an experiment intended by the Office of Economic
Opportunity to strengthen the case for a guaranteed income several
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Nixon proposed welfare reform along the lines of the New Jersey experi-
ment. Positive findings would have to appear early if they were to aid
passage of the bill. "Well before [the experiment] was completed,"
recalls Moynihan, "a President had embraced its principles and hoped-
for conclusions . . Inevitably, there arose a conflict between the
methodological demands of social science and the political needs of
Congress and the Administration, and perhaps just as inevitably, the
latter won out.’’32 Officials "broke into" the data and produced their
"preliminary" findings in February 1970.
"There is no evidence that work effort declined among those receiv-
ing income support payments," the Office of Economic Opportunity
report concluded. "On the contrary, there is an indication that the work
effort of participants receiving payments increased relative to the work
effort of those not receiving payments.’’33 These findings ran counter to
the predictions of economic theory that income supplements would
encourage people to work less, but were welcome news to those
supporting the bill.
Officials later backpedaled a bit, but the initial findings were cited
repeatedly by politicians and economists who supported the negative
income tax. A 1971 report on the New Jersey experiment again conclud-
ed that work effort is "undiminished by negative tax transfers.’’34
Andrew Brimmer, an economist and member of the Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System, told an audience in June 1971 that "There
is well-founded evidence [e.g., the results of the New Jersey Graduated
Work Incentive Experiment] showing that poor people prefer to
work--even when they receive an income supplement.’’3s Moderates
and liberals in Congress used the findings to support guaranteed
income plans. A universal income floor would yield "great economic
benefits [and] create incentives [to work. The New Jersey experiment]
shows this very clearly," Senator Harris claimed.36 When asked on the
House floor whether the Family Assistance Plan would create incentives
to work, Ways and Means Committee Chairman Wilbur Mills replied
that, as regards New Jersey, "their final report will indicate the success
of that experiment.’ ,37 References to the experimental results in the con-
gressional hearings and floor debates are few; by and large, the negative
income tax experiment was ignored, but, when it was cited, the
misleading preliminary findings received the most attention.
After the Government Accounting Office criticized its preliminary
findings, the Office of Economic Opportunity backed away from the
shaky claim that the income guarantee actually increased work effort.3s
Now officials asserted that the most reasonable conclusion from New
Jersey was that work effort did decrease but not by much. "We have not
picked up any precipitous decline in work effort. That is the major crux
of our findings," John Wilson, assistant director of the Office of180 Dennis ]. Coyle and Aaron Wildavsk~
Economic Opportunity, reported to the Senate Finance Committee. He
emphasized the positive by claiming that "low-income people are
strongly work motivated," basing that assertion not on behavioral
evidence, but on an opinion survey of recipients.39 The New Jersey
results, William Morrill of Health, Education, and Welfare concluded:
. . o clearly indicate that a negative tax type plan.., will not trigger large
scale reductions in work effort . . . only minor cost implicatio.ns should
be expected... Offsetting these would be the potential for substantially
reducing income poverty, increasing the command of the poor over
material goods and services, and enhancing their freedom to choose
among economic options (emphasis added).40
The New Jersey team apparently followed the advice that if you
cannot win, declare victory. They had found evidence that income
guarantees could decrease, not increase, work effort; hence they con-
cluded that "the burden of proof would now appear to be on those who
assert that income maintenance programs for intact families will have
very large effects on labor supply.’’41 According to those sharing this
view, the battle for the negative income tax was nearly won: "Public
opposition to coverage of all intact families by an income-related cash-
transfer program . . . should decrease," claimed Michael Barth, Larry
Orr and John Palmer. "The case for a work test . . . is weakened.’’42
Ultimately, the New Jersey experiment had little to do with the
political fortunes of the Family Assistance Plan. But the Office of
Economic Opportunity cannot be faulted for lack of trying. In its hands,
through creative interpretation of results, the negative income tax
experiment was partially molded into arguments for the proponents.
But it was still a policy experiment, with ambiguous and undramatic
results, hardly equal to the task of overcoming fundamental cultural
disputes, the gulf between the egalitarian nirvana of Senator Harris and
the libertarian lesson of the Red Hen fable.
The Modest Role of Experimentation
Policy research has been criticized as being an impediment to
reform. Henry Aaron says that analysis is "profoundly conservative,"
strengthening opposition to change by pointing out the imperfections in
any reform proposal. David Greenberg and Philip Robins claim that
"The probability of enactment [of proposals such as the guaranteed
income] was reduced as a direct consequence of experimentally testing
them.’’43 This conclusion is easy to reach if one believes the policies
advocated are innately good and would be supported by the public if
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the President and key members of Congress fail, a sinister force must be
at work, and the misuse of policy analysis by the opponents of change
becomes a convenient scapegoat.
If the only choices are to maintain the status quo or completely
transform the society, then perhaps experimentation would have a con-
servative role. But this is hardly the usual picture; more often policy
research has a moderating influence, showing us that a change in policy
would, neither be as beneficial as some might hope nor as harmful as
others might fear. This, indeed, is the legacy of the income maintenance
experiments. They showed that there would be work reductions, but of
modest proportions; they also demonstrated that it was practical to
administer the program. The consequences of the experiments were
conservative only in light of inflated promises: that the income
maintenance plans were not guaranteed incomes, would increase work
effort, and would reduce the burden on taxpayers. No amount of
research could credibly support these claims.
The guaranteed income proposals failed not because policy research
had a conservative effect, but because they were orphaned by the
welfare establishment and its egalitarian supporters. Caught between
conflicting demands, the Family Assistance Plan was seen as not giving
enough to each to secure passage. This insufficiency was a consequence
of the legislation itself and the expectations of the times; failure cannot
be blamed on the experiments. "Research, no matter how relevant and
competent," Michael Barth and his coauthors remind us, "cannot tell us
what national policy ought to be.’’a4
Far from preceding policy, data are inextricably intertwined with the
theories on which public policies are based. In formulating policy,
therefore, there is no unalterable need to get the numbers straight before
doing anything else. On the contrary, it is the policy one has in mind
that determines which data, accurate to what degree, are relevant.45
Scientists acknowledge the "objectivity" of results by certifying
among themselves the integrity of the process, not by direct apprehen-
sion of the facts. Appeal to the facts to resolve disputes is possible only
when there is prior consensus, both as to the implicit conceptual
framework (the language of discourse) and the rules of resolution. And
this consensus was lacking at the time of the New Jersey negative in-
come tax experiment.
Why did this integrative approach, blessed with an integrative
name--family assistance--and an integrative argument--use market
methods to secure equity and social order--fail in garnering sufficient
support? The Family Assistance Plan died not because the demise of
welfare reform was inevitable but because in those days the elites who
spoke for egalitarianism would not go along. In their eyes, reform was
certainly too little, perhaps too late. Everyone had to be made better off.182 Dennis J, Coyle and Aaron Wildavsky
No means test was permissible. Nothing could be left for tomorrow. The
existing system was so rotten that only the most radical change was
tolerable. They demanded far greater expenditure so that all welfare
recipients would immediately receive substantially more, while deni-
grating the considerable change that could be accomplished, thus cast-
ing a pall over income maintenance before it was defeated.
Yet facets of the negative income tax have been incorporated into
poverty policy. Although the proposal of a guaranteed income for
families died, a guaranteed income for the needy aged, blind and dis-
abled was enacted (Supplemental Security Income). A universal income
was rejected, yet a far-reaching food stamp program was adopted.
These alternatives succeeded because they were perceived as more inte-
grative solutions: SSI provided aid to a group that even libertarians
might concede merited special assistance; food stamps pleased hierar-
chists by supporting an important institution--the farm--while provid-
ing for a basic need--food for the unfortunate.
What could have happened, we ask, in the spirit of counterfactual
history, if the Family Assistance Plan, like the 1986 tax reform legisla-
tion, had been accepted by egalitarians as a basis for negotiation rather
than rejected as inherently flawed? The morale of the sponsors would
have received a tremendous boost. The prospects of gaining credit for an
historical change, rather than taking the blame for the failures of
welfare, might have engendered a broader appeal. As long as the
presumed beneficiaries thought it good for them, the prospects for social
peace, dear to the hearts of hierarchs, and for self-reliance, as individu-
alists desired, might have appeared brighter.
Had the Family Assistance Plan passed, the New Jersey negative
income tax experiment might have been hailed as a visionary social
experiment, policy research at its best, providing it was practical to
implement a novel social solution. But its success would have been due
far more to facilitating political circumstances that allowed for
ideological compromise than to any consequences of experimentation.
The role of the income maintenance experiments in the political
battles over the Family Assistance Plan paled in comparison with the
vigorous ideological clashes. "Rarely, if ever," Burke and Burke tell us
in their authoritative book, "has a proposal met with such misinformed
but energetic attack.’’46 Income maintenance challenged fundamental
beliefs about the good life--how to live it, who is obligated to whom for
what--and it was on this ground that the battle was fought. Experimen-
tation may point the way toward specific policy solutions once there is
sufficient consensus to make broad support possible, but research can-
not replace the dialogue among supporters of different ways of life.
Were research a substitute for mutual persuasion, there would be no
democracy, no pluralism, and, in the end, no decent research.SOCIAL EXPERIMENTATION 183
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Hugh Heclo*
The Coyle/Wildavsky paper asks why an effort to radically reform
the welfare system should have failed. Their answer is derived from a
tripartite view of American political culture. Essentially, the egalitarians
were unwilling to accept half a loaf.
First point. It is not clear why it is so necessary to rev up cultural
theory and overheat the word processor to explain the fate of welfare
reform in 1969-70. We can expect that it will be difficult to persuade
Americans (elite or mass) about the merits of a plan for transferring
some of their money to an easily despised fraction of the population.
Second point. Taking the premises of the analysis, the conclusion of
the paper is not only self-evident but preordained. Given that America
is composed of three cultures; given that radical change is defined as a
major alteration in relative power; it follows that radical reform will re-
quire the consent of the three cultural blocs. Q.E.D. Of course this coun-
try has shown it is possible to obtain radical change by playing two
against one. But that is not called reform. It is called civil war. Working
with the Coyle/Wildavsky formulation, we can only wonder why
historians have spent so much time debating the causes of the Civil War
and missed the fact that it was the egalitarians (Abolitionists) and in-
dividualists (Northern capitalists) ganging up on the hierarchs (guess
who).
Third point. While ! sincerely believe there are substantial insights
to be derived from the recent movement to apply cultural concepts to
American politics, I must say that this paper tells us little about the
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historical and political context of the negative income tax experiments as
such, the focus of this conference. We are told that at times the results of
the experiments were used as political ammunition and that those back-
ing the experiments may have been a bit naive about the relationship of
social science findings to policymaking. No news here. Working within
the confines of the paper, the relevant--and unaddressed--question is
this: What is the relation between this idea of three cultures on the one
hand and the creation and operation of the income maintenance experi-
ments on the other? If this were older history and none of the partici-
pants in question were alive to argue back, it might be an easier question
to answer. Would all of the egalitarians pushing negative income tax ex-
periments in the 1960s please stand up? Since this whole effort at per-
forming deliberate social experiments on Americans was a pretty radical
departure for the federal government, did not the individualists and
hierarchs in the audience have to sign on too? When it comes down to it,
who among us thinks that his or her views can be jammed into one of
these three pigeonholes?
I believe there are important issues lurking in the larger context of
these experiments. Unfortunately they are not revealed in this paper.
The phenomenon of social experimentation was itself a sociopolitical ex-
periment. What was happening here--was something worth intellectual
attention going on beyond the particular experimental findings? Forget
the substantive results for a moment. What did this phenomenon mean?
Thankfully, i have not been given the job of trying to write such a
paper. In the remaining space allotted to me, and drawing as best I can
on several other papers, let me offer one possible sketch.
The negative income tax experiments represented the triumph of
what Richard Elmore in his paper terms an analytic subgovernment. No
politician in the White House, no congressman, no interest group as
conventionally defined and no lobby of rank and file citizens was press-
ing for a multi-million dollar system of negative income tax experiments.
Their creation was the work of a more or less autonomous economics
profession and a particular school within economics at that. One part of
the story is how their intellectual constructs came to prevail in this
postwar period. A more obscure but no less important part of the story
is how their closest disciplinary competitors for thinking about the
poverty issue--social work/sociology--collapsed from within. It is a
story hinted at in the Coyle/Wildavsky paper’s mention of social
workers" reaction to the proposed Family Assistance Plan. A discipline
filled with such loathing for its own tradition was simply no match for
the economists.
That the income maintenance experiments could happen in this way
tells us, I think, something even more important. It tells us how far we
have come from our original vision in this country about the role ofDISCUSSION 187
social science. One hundred years ago, the founders of America’s
modern system of social investigation (Spencer Baird, Otis Mason,
Ainsworth Rand Spofford, John Eaton, Francis Amasa Walker, John
Wesley Powell, Lester Ward and Carroll Wright, to name a few) saw
social inquiry as a new kind of instrument for linking state and civil
society. Social science was seen to have a civic purpose. By contrast, the
massive machine of negative income tax experimentation can be seen as
an indicator of just how far apart have been drifting the separate realms
of politics, social science, and the understandings of ordinary citizens.
Existing in this kind of splendid isolation, the negative income tax
experiments represented a centralizing, reductionist impulse--a search
for the one right answer--that comes naturally to a single disciplinary
view of the world. Only from this mindset could it make sense to spend
millions of dollars on four experiments to see if people worked less in
response to income guarantees and next to nothing to find out what
they did with any lessened time on the job. So much for economists’
supposed preoccupation with scarce resources.
As we all know, the negative income tax mentality (the wit of NIT?)
has gone into remission and no talk of income guarantees for the poor is
to be heard in the land (the non-poor are another matter). What has
been left in its wake? These social experiments themselves became part
of the new historical and political context. On the one hand the whole
episode probably contributed to the no less monofocal view of those
reacting against income guarantees, against "incentives" for proper
behavior rather than punishments for bad, against the dependency°
creating effects of poverty programs, and so on. As for the negative in-
come tax experimenters, at least it can be said that they were trying to
find answers to questions about which they were not sure. Their conser-
vative successors in the monofocal sweepstakes of American politics are
more interested in bringing an indictment based on the way in which
they know the world works.
On the other hand, and of longer lasting importance, the negative
income tax experiments broke ground for a succeeding generation of
social experimentation. It is a generation not only of more refined
techniques but also, as Barbara Blum’s paper reminds us, of more sensi-
ble connections to existing political and administrative structures. The
era of the single, dramatic, Washington-centered experiment is gone,
gone as quickly as it arrived. In its place is the more familiar pluralism of
social inquiry involving state and local governments, foundations, more
disciplines. I suppose we could take the author of the concluding paper,
Dick Nathan, as a representative character in this evolution. His migra-
tion from the old New Federalism of revenue-sharing to the central
income guarantees of the Family Assistance Plan, and hence to the fine-
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with services and multi-program approaches, tracks rather well with the
central tendencies of our time.
If we are willing to pause for a moment and look past the experimen-
tal findings, the controversies about workfare, the budgetary pressures
on new research funds.., if we are willing to be so untopical as to even
look past the hot ideas for any next round of welfare reform, what we
will see in the last 20 years is a society more busily engaged than ever in
seriously trying to know itself.Discussion
Lawrence M. Mead*
Authors Dennis J o Coyle and Aaron Wildavsky argue that welfare
reform did not pass because it failed to satisfy the conflicting cultures in
American politics. Major reform in the United States, they contend,
must usually appeal to all three of these cultures. Their ideals are respec-
tively hierarchy (a concern for social order and due place), egalitarianism
(equality of condition), and individualism (equal opportunity).
These categories have the appeal that they exhaust the major ideals
to be found in political theory. Behind them lie the great names of
Burke, Rousseau, and Locke. But I would question whether they are
equally rooted in American politics. Where are the American hierarchs?
I thought that aristocratic visions of society went out of American
politics no later than 1800, when Jefferson defeated the Federalists.
Since then, even the right wing in American politics has had to appeal to
the people.1
It is true that American government involves a degree of hierarchy
and authority. The New Deal still sets the frame of American politics,
and New Deal politics was highly organized. Large-scale political struc-
tures, both parties and interest groups, mediated the demands of the
people to government, and New Deal policy used public bureaucracy on
a new scale to serve the people.2 The social vision, however, was a
Lockian one, and not a Tory one as the term hierarchy might imply.
Government was still the servant, not the master, of the people. Its aim
was not to enforce social inequality but to ameliorate it, albeit by steps
well short of socialism.
And as the authors suggest, even governmental hierarchy has since
come into question. After 1960, an egalitarian politics of protest and
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single-interest groups undercut the traditional parties. Community
Action and other innovative grant programs inaugurated a new, anti-
bureaucratic style of federal public administration.3 These trends were
answered in turn, not by a reaffirmation of hierarchy, but by a
recrudescence of free-market conservatism. Today, it would seem, the
egalitarian and individualist persuasions--those that denigrate
authority--dominate the political culture.
Coyle and Wildavsky suggest that welfare reform failed because the
three cultures refused to compromise. The egalitarians demanded a
degree of income guarantee unacceptable to the individualists, while the
hierarchs wanted to enforce values, especially a work requirement, that
were unacceptable to either of the others. In part, I agree. This analysis
is certainly an improvement over the view, emphasized in other
accounts,4 that reform failed largely because of conventional "New
Deal" disagreements between left and right over the scale of govern-
ment.
But this view fails to explain the most startling thing about welfare
politics--the fact that the public is nowhere near as divided as the elites.
The public lines up unequivocally with what Coyle and Wildavsky call
the hierarchical position. It wants to guarantee the poor jobs rather than
income, and this preference extends even to minorities and the poor
themselves. The polls that the authors cite positively radiate the desire
to enforce at least minimal norms through public authority, the animus
that is so lacking in the other two cultures.
Some Congressmen spoke for this position in the Family Assistance
Plan debates. I call them the moderates or civic conservatives. Their
leaders were Martha Griffiths and Russell Long. It could even be said
that they defined the consensus toward which the debate progressed.
Over time, the welfare plans in Congress relied more on requirements,
less on incentives, as the mechanism for promoting work by the
employable. But the moderates were outnumbered, and eventually
disagreements among all the gr~oups killed reform. The same disputes,
along with a greater fear of costs, killed Jimmy Carter’s welfare plan, the
Program for Better Jobs and Income.s
There seems to be a division between what I would call social opin-
ion and political opinion. Unpolitical Americans are the ones who speak
for hierarchical values, who want to use government, not just to help
people, but to enforce the civilities essential to American life, one of
which is work for the able-bodied. Most active politicians, however,
want government to serve the values of freedom and opportunity rather
than order. Liberals locate the main barriers to freedom in private soci-
ety, while conservatives find them in government itself. Liberals there-
fore want a larger government, to protect people from the economy,
while conservatives want a smaller one, to give the economy full sway.DISCUSSION 191
The public seems to be little interested in these disputes. A study by
Verba and Orren shows sharp polarization between liberal and conserv-
ative groups over whether "the system" or the poor themselves are
responsible for poverty.6 But these are the views of elites, bound up in
the New Deal struggle over the scale of government. According to other
studies, unpolitical Americans reject this polarity. They hold both
government and the individual responsible for social problems. They
are much less interested in changing how much is done for the poor
than in enforcing decent behavior on those who are helped.7
Why were the politicians not as unified as the public about welfare?
In the authors’ terms, why is the hierarchical persuasion much the
strongest among ordinary citizens, while individualist and egalitarian
visions that deny the need for public authority flourish among elites?
Concretely, why do politicians not do in welfare what the public wants, which
is to guarantee the needy a sustenance but make the employable work
for it?
That is the great mystery in welfare politics. Merely to label the per-
suasions as different cultures does not account for it. My own view is
that it must go back to the founding of the country. The framers of the
Constitution, alone of founding elites, construed their task as the limita-
tion rather than the enhancement of national public authority. They
presided over a healthy society in which reform at the hands of govern-
ment never would be as necessary as in the modernizing societies of
Europe (or now of the Third World). They construed government as the
product of society, rather than society as the creation of an enlightened
government. Ever since, the main political dispute has been how, not
whether, to subject public authority to the people. That has made it
tougher to use government for the tasks of social reconstruction that
exist even in America, of which the most daunting today is integrating
the welfare class.
In welfare, reform failed partly for pluralist reasons. The authors
mention that specific groups--for example, social workers, Southern
politicians, the National Welfare Rights Organization--would have lost
from it and thus opposed it. Welfare is certainly a subject on which con-
sensus is notoriously elusive. The fundamental reason for defeat,
however, was that the reforming elites were out of step with public
opinion. They would not or could not reform welfare in the way or-
dinary Americans wanted. They would not enforce social obligations
like work in return for benefits.
Social order as a concern entered prominently into welfare politics.
Welfare is a fundamental disorder in American life. Long-term
dependency is offensive to the American social vision of a nation of
equivalent citizens. It is also a cause of other disorders such as crime,
drug addiction, and the decline of the schools. Thus, the public has192 Lawrence M. Mead
strong views about it and demands that any reform reduce disorder.
In welfare, the central issue is not who should be subsidized or who
should win or lose, but how to elevate the seriously dependent so that
they can even play the political game like other people. Welfare politics
is abnormal. The question is how to create the community that is
assumed in ordinary politics. It is how to make the poor self-reliant
enough so that the stakes of politics are no longer critical.
Abnormal politics is much more distressing to the public than ordi-
nary politics. It raises basic issues of personal and social identity that
ordinarily never come up. Pressures for change arise, not from economic
claims, but from social dysfunction. Claims arise, not from competent
economic interests, but, so to speak, from the disassembly of the per-
sonality. The long-term dependent do not have their lives "together"
enough to be the kind of individuals imagined in either the individualist
or the egalitarian vision of society. Whoever is to blame, they threaten
social order at a much more fundamental level than anything about the
tax system, for example.
Questions of social order expose the limitations of federal gover-
nance. Whether we speak of a New Deal division or competing individ-
ualist and egalitarian visions, all the dominant tendencies in Washing-
ton seek to assume what in social policy must be created--a nation of
competent citizens. Would that they listened more to the civic attitudes
articulated by public opinion. The problem in social p~olicy is to make
government as civic-minded as society.
There is an additional problem too. The serious claims in modern
politics are about dependency, and yet elites have not learned to talk
about them rigorously. We have a language for discussing claims to
political freedoms. It is the language of democracy and civil liberties, the
language of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, of what one
might call middle-class politics. But--except in South Africa--these
issues are passe. We also have a language for discussing claims to
economic protection. It is the language of socialism and collectivism, the
language of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, of what one may
call working-class politics. But, despite the ambitions of the Reagan ad-
ministration, the welfare state is established and its boundaries are
unlikely to change much anywhere in the West.
We do not have a language to discuss the claims that arise from the
appearance of an underclass in Western societies. What does one do
about the social dysfunction that remains even after a society has carried
out the reforms specified in middle-class and working-class politics?
Who is to blame for serious dependency, and what is to be done about
it? Disputes revolve around claims to determinism, not claims to
freedom in the earlier sense. Those who speak for the poor assert that
they are dominated by their environment and not responsible forDISCUSSION 193
dysfunction, while their opponents deny it. The earlier theories all
assumed that even the downtrodden were accountable for decent per-
sonal behavior, while in dependency politics, that assumption is itself
the main issue.
Perhaps the final reason that welfare reform did not succeed is that
welfare raised embarrassing issues of personal adequacy that politicians
hate to talk about. The moral of past welfare reform is that we have to
talk about them. We need serious arguments, based on research, that go
beyond rhetoric on the serious behavioral questions in welfare. Who is
and who is not responsible for personal functioning, and for what
specific competences? What is the potential for human nature to achieve
civility?rathe very question that conventional political and economic
theory never asks.s
Such languages do not eliminate disagreement, but they clarify
views and, over time, narrow the differences. Consensus can then be
embodied in policy. Recent discussions of the welfare problem have
been newly open about discussing the behavioral problems, and that is a
step on the way. The goal is a political theory and a constitutional doc-
trine about permissible degrees of dependency, such as we already have
for civil liberties and economic regulation. Only on this basis could
government set a standard for behavior on welfare and enforce it, as the
public wants.
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